Small-scale co-management for the sustainable use of Xilingol biosphere reserve, inner Mongolia.
There exists a negative externality of livestock breeding due to the difference between private and social breeding cost in Xilingol Biosphere Reserve (XBR), Inner Mongolia, that has caused extensive ecological degradation of the grassland. The property rights regime, the household production responsibility system (HPRS), was adopted in the 1980s to increase livestock production in XBR. Although HPRS has successfully increased production by promoting private economic interests, it has led to grassland degradation due to inefficient enforcement of stock rate. Through interviews conducted with government representatives and herding families in all management units of XBR, we elucidate the shortfalls of the current management regime and the Fencing Grassland and Moving Users policy initiated in 2002 to restore grassland. We propose an alternative property rights regime, small-scale co-management, to concurrently promote both individual economic interests and grassland conservation by improving the enforcement of stock rate.